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ABSTRACT 
Recent empirical work suggests that (i) incomes are converging through 
time, and (ii) income and pollution levels are linked. This paper weds these two literatures 
by examining the spatial and temporal distribution of pollution. After establishing 
that theoretical predictions about whether pollution will converge are critically linked to 
certain structural parameters, we explore pollution convergence using state-level data 
on two important pollutants—nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides—from 1929 to 1999. We 
find stronger evidence of converging emission rates during the federal pollution control 
years (1970–1999) than during the local control years (1929–1969). These results suggest 
that income convergence alone may not be sufficient to induce convergence of pollutant 
emissions. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Examining the appropriate division of functions among different levels of 
government has increased in popularity during the past two decades. In academic 
circles, Musgrave’s (1959) seminal treatment of the public sector served to 
stimulate interest in the federalist nature of governmental structures some four 
decades ago. Musgrave divided the public fiscal department into three branches: 
allocation, distribution, and stabilization; but perhaps the area attracting the 
most attention of late is the allocation branch—determining the optimal institutional 
arrangements for the provision of public goods and services (see, e.g., 
Oates, 1991, 2002). Within this large scope of duties lies the responsibility for 
setting and enforcing environmental regulations. 
 
A hotly debated issue revolves around the merits of regulation at each 
level: some conjecture that in a second-best world where initial distortions are 
present, locally determined environmental regulations are likely to be suboptimal 
when jurisdictions compete with each other to attract capital (Oates and 
Schwab, 1988). Alternatively, others (notably Wilson, 1996) provide theoretical 
arguments that suggest localities may either “race to the top” (the NIMBY phenomenon) 
or “race to the bottom” when setting environmental regulations. Regulatory 
federalism issues are much more than academic curiosity, as concern 
over a race to the bottom led the U.S. government to create the environmental 
protection agency (EPA) in 1970 and to pass subsequent legislation establishing 
national ambient standards for air and water quality (List and Gerking, 
2000). 
 
The ongoing debate also has implications beyond policy circles: in both a 
positive and normative perspective the issue has considerable merits. First, 
equity may be important. Although a literature is developing that examines 
the distributional characteristics of pollution (see, e.g., Brooks and Sethi, 1997; 
Arora and Cason, 1999; List, 1999; Millimet and List, 2003; Strazicich and List, 
2003), little has been done to link the effects of centralization (or devolution) 
of environmental authority to the distribution of pollutant emissions. Considerable 
evidence has mounted that suggests certain pollutants have threshold 
effects (e.g., Arrow et al., 1995), and therefore health affects from higher pollution 
levels are best represented by, for example, an exponential function. Accordingly, 
ceteris paribus, an optimal spatial pattern of pollution would favor 
dilution rather than agglomeration. 
 
Second, Solow’s (1956) neoclassical growth model implies that given similar 
economy characteristics of population growth, savings, depreciation, and 
technology, per capita incomes will converge across countries and regions. Given 
permanent differences in these characteristics, the Solow model predicts that 
incomes will converge “conditionally” to their own steady-state, or “compensating 
differential.” Thus, the Solow model predicts that relatively poor regions 
will catch up to relatively rich regions, although permanent income differences 
will likely remain. Recent empirical evidence suggests that incomes are indeed 
converging across U.S. states and regions (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1991; Carlino and Mills, 1993, 1996; Evans and Karras, 1996a,b; Loewy and 
Papell, 1996; Quah, 1996; Webber, White, and Allen, 2005). If one links incomes 
and environmental outcomes via the Coase theorem (Hamilton, 1995), 
these findings leave open the possibility that income levels adjusted for environmental 
quality will also converge (see also Brock and Taylor, 2004). 
 
The theoretical perspective on these matters is ambiguous. Even in the 
context of a simple Solow growth model one might find converging or diverging 
pollution levels. Adding complicating (but realistic) features like interjurisdictional 
competition for capital adds to the potentially rich set of results that may 
be obtained in theory. With such conflicting predictions from theory, we turn 
to an empirical analysis to explore whether pollutant emissions are converging 
across theU.S. states in the 20th century.We present evidence concerning these 
issues by examining 1929–1999 state-level data on emissions of sulfur dioxides 
and nitrogen oxides. To provide an indication of the effects of centralization on 
the distribution of emissions, we split the sample into two regimes—1929–1969 
and 1970–1999—and use time series tests with structural breaks to test for converging 
emissions. The early sample period represents an era of state and local 
pollution control whereas the latter years correspond to an era of significant 
federal presence.1 
 
We find that during the years of state pollution control, emissions of pollutants 
for about one-half of the states are not converging. Interestingly, after 
centralization of environmental standards, emissions are converging in 
about three-quarters of the states. These results are consistent with the Solow 
model described in Section 2, but also suggest the possibility of environmental 
dumping—competition between localities to attract capital investment (see, 
e.g., Jeppesen, List, and Folmer, 2002). According to this perspective, poorer 
regions may have traded environmental quality for relative income gains prior 
to 1970, but were restricted in their ability to do so after 1970. Regardless of interpretation, 
importantly, this result suggests that convergence of income may 
not be sufficient to induce convergence of some pollutant types. Our findings 
are consistent with the conjecture of Brooks and Sethi (1997) that “without 
[nation-wide ambient] standards, the disparities faced by certain subpopulations 
in the United States will not diminish appreciably in the foreseeable 
future.” Although our data are aggregate in nature, whereas Brooks and Sethi 
(1997) use disaggregate data, it is interesting that their intuition is consistent 
with our empirical results. 
 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches 
the main linkages between income growth and pollution when environmental 
regulation is implemented at the state and federal level. Section 3 describes the 
data. Section 4 presents the empirical methods and results. Section 5 provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. POLLUTION PATTERNS AND CONVERGENCE 
 
An interesting body of literature examining the determinants of spatial 
pollution patterns has emerged recently (Gianessi, Peskin, and Wolff, 1979; 
Hamilton, 1995; Brooks and Sethi, 1997; Arora and Cason, 1999). Adding to 
this literature, we note that there are two distinct empirical observations that 
are germane to the issue of pollution convergence. First, as mentioned in the 
previous section, state and regional income levels are generally converging over 
time. Second, there is evidence of an inverted U-shaped relation between income 
and certain pollutants—the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).2 Grossman 
and Krueger (1995) provide some support in favor of the EKC for local stock 
pollutants, and List and Gallet (1999) and Millimet et al. (2003) find some 
evidence of such a relationship for emissions of NOx and SO2 across U.S. states 
(we should note, however, that Azomahou, Laisney, and Nguyen Van (2006) 
use a nonparametric panel data model to show that this nonmonotonic relation 
does not hold for CO2—a global stock pollutant). The combination of income 
convergence and the EKC necessarily implies that theory produces ambiguous 
predictions about whether pollution profiles are converging or diverging. 
 
The intuition is simple (a formal derivation is available in the Appendix). 
Consider a simple Solow growth model where pollution is a byproduct of 
consumption—but may be mitigated by abatement—and where a “mechanism” 
is built into the model to ensure an inverted U-shaped relation between income 
and pollution. Following the literature, this mechanism may be driven 
by political economy considerations, increasing returns to scale in abatement, 
or technical change. With equilibrium income growth governed by exogenous 
technical change in production, there must be absolute convergence of pollution 
in the long term. Pollution levels may fall to zero if incomes get sufficiently high 
or approach arbitrary low levels, but eventually they will converge. 
 
The “not-so-long-term” perspective is rather different, however. Absolute 
pollution levels may converge or diverge—both during the approach to the balanced 
growth paths and along balanced growth paths. States with different 
income levels will converge towards their own balanced income and pollution 
path, but this implies that for some states (with “low” incomes) the growth rate 
of pollutants will be positive whereas for other states (with “high” incomes) the 
growth rate is negative. Pollution levels may converge or diverge, depending 
on income differences between states. When such income differences are small, 
convergence will occur; when differences are large, pollution levels may diverge. 
 
We will briefly discuss two extensions of this basic story, highlighting that 
the picture becomes even less clear when adding further realistic elements to 
the model. First, we may consider the case where environmental regulation is 
the responsibility of the federal government rather than the state, as has been 
effectively the case in the U.S. since 1970.3 As shown by Andreoni and Levinson 
(2001), when the federal government maximizes the sum of state utilities and 
accounts for spillover costs, the shape of the pollution/income path does not 
change. While optimal consumption (abatement) levels are lower (higher) from 
a federal perspective when compared to the local optimum (so that the level 
of the pollution/income path is affected); the pollution path’s shape does not 
change. In the long run absolute convergence is expected; in the short and 
medium run convergence towards the balanced pollution path occurs, and absolute 
pollution levels in different states may diverge or converge. 
 
Second, we may consider what happens when capital is a mobile production 
factor. In a first-best world, states will not lower taxes to attract capital—doing 
so would reduce local welfare and induce Tiebout migration (where residents 
“vote with their feet”; see Tiebout, 1956, but also Oates and Schwab, 1988, and 
Wellisch, 2000).4 Real-life politics, however, takes place in a context littered 
with pre-existing distortions. Key assumptions of the benchmark model are 
likely violated in reality. Examples include lack of market power in national 
capital markets, absence of strategic interaction with respect to other localities, 
and access to a perfect range of regulatory instruments. In such a context, 
“optimal” local regulation might well be different from the first-best benchmark, 
as environmental policies should take distortions into account. 
 
For example, competition for capital in a world in which the social return 
to capital exceeds the private return could give rise to sub-optimally low taxes. 
This might be caused by capital taxation, but there are many other potential 
distortions. For example, in the case of unemployment due to wage rigidities, it 
may be rational for governments to choose “low” tax levels to reduce unemployment 
costs (Wilson, 1996).5 If tighter environmental regulation decreases the 
rate of return on investment, then Krugman’s (1997) quip becomes important: 
“any country which has a pre-existing tendency to attract too little capital will 
have an incentive to avoid such regulations; whereas a collective, international 
decision to impose higher standards would not lead to capital flight, because 
the capital would have nowhere to go.”6 
The theoretical insight that local policies may be distorted is consonant 
with the following quote, which highlights that state policymakers will trade 
off environmental quality to attract manufacturing firms and jobs: 
 
“We have traded the environment for jobs. . .where the environment became 
either totally or partially damaged, in some instances permanently. However, 
we have no regrets, no remorse.”—Edwin Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, 
1979. 
 
If states in a second-best context compete for mobile capital and, in terms 
of environmental stringency, “race to the bottom,” local economies are not on a 
single equilibrium income and pollution path. Specifically, when local standards 
or taxes are relaxed, the economy shifts to an increasingly higher pollution 
path. If only a subset of states is engaged in competition, then divergence of 
pollution is expected to occur. In this case, some states willingly “drift” from 
one pollution/income path to the next while others follow a single path over 
time. This provides an alternative prediction for the intertemporal behavior of 
pollution paths. 
 
Writing about the potential efficiency losses associated with interjurisdictional 
competition, Oates (2002) concludes that “we are badly in need of empirical 
estimates of these distortions.” The analysis below attempts to provide a 
first step in this direction. 
 
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
We empirically analyze the spatial distribution of air pollution emissions 
by examining the time-series convergence proposition suggested in Carlino and 
Mills (1993). Described more fully below, we first examine the natural log of 
the ratio of state per capita emissions relative to average per capita emissions 
to test if shocks are permanent or temporary.7 If shocks to the log ratio are 
temporary, then the series is “stochastically converging;” alternatively, if shocks 
are permanent, then divergence is evident. As noted by Carlino and Mills (1993), 
although stochastic convergence is necessary for convergence to occur, it is not 
sufficient.8 They note that the log relative series should also be examined to see 
if trending towards the mean. Since this time series test for “_-convergence” 
does not include a measure of the initial value of the log emissions series on 
the right-hand side of the regression, the test is not subject to criticisms noted 
for the cross-section test.9 Using each testing procedure, we examine both preand 
post-1970 emission rates. 
 
To test for converging emissions, we analyze state per capita emissions 
of two criteria air pollutants: sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) 
(see also List, 1999; List and Gallet, 1999; and Millimet et al., 2003 who make 
use of these data). These choices are mainly driven by data considerations, 
as no other emissions data that we are aware of span from 1929 to 1999, but 
they also offer interesting pollutants to examine. The original Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970 targeted SO2 early on due to its adverse health effects on 
humans and its negative impact through the deposition of acid rain. Quantified 
health effects associated with prolonged exposures to SO2 include changes in 
pulmonary functions, respiratory ailments, and in extreme cases premature 
death. SO2 can also significantly damage crops and man-made structures; total 
global damage estimates range in the hundreds of millions of dollars (U.S. EPA, 
1997). These and other deleterious effects associated with SO2 emissions led 
policymakers to take an early strong stance against emitters of SO2 in an effort 
to substantially curb emissions (Gianessi et al., 1979).NOx, onthe other hand, is 
a precursor to ozone, can induce respiratory effects in humans, form particulate 
nitrates, and is a component of acid rain. 
 
Our emissions data are available for each of the 48 contiguous states 
over the period 1929–1994 and come from National Air Pollutant Emission 
Trends (U.S. EPA, 1994). The EPA kindly provided additional data covering the 
period 1995–1999. The emission-estimating methodologies fall into two categories. 
From 1929–1984 emissions are calculated using a “top-down” approach, 
whereby state-level information on different fuel type use was entered in an algorithm 
to determine the various pollution emissions. For example, state level 
data on coal consumption was entered in an “emission factor” equation to determine 
the pounds of SO2 produced for each ton of coal consumed. Emission 
factors were adjusted by the EPA for differences in age and type of utility, among 
other factors, when possible. Prior to the 1970s, there were fewer differences 
in emissions due to age of utility and control factors. While the primary fuel 
consumption measure was at the state-level, in some cases such data was not 
available. In this case, national fuel consumption data was employed to estimate 
state-level emissions as a fraction of the national.10 From 1985 to 1999, 
emissions are estimated using a “bottom-up” methodology whereby emissions 
are derived at the plant or county level and aggregated to the state level. Note 
that utilizing data relative to the mean, and allowing for structural breaks, 
mitigates problems associated with combining two potentially heterogeneous 
data sets. 
 
 
 
 
 
To indicate the degree of progress that has been made to curb emissions in 
the last three decades, we present Table 1, which provides a breakdown of the 
national emissions estimates from 1970 to 1994. The data presented show that 
SO2 emissions were significantly declining after federal intervention: between 
1970 and 1994 raw SO2 emissions decreased from 31,161 thousand short tons 
to 21,118 thousand short tons, a reduction of nearly 33 percent. Alternatively, 
while NOx emissions increased by over 180 percent from 1940 to 1970, emissions 
since 1970 have leveled off at about 23 million short tons since 1973. The 
result for SO2 is consistent with our prediction that centralization lowers aggregate 
emissions; while the data show that centralization did not decrease the 
level of NOx, it did significantly lower its growth rate. Yet the limited progress 
that has been made to reduceNOx emissions highlights why ozone has attracted 
the most regulatory attention of late. While these data patterns are interesting 
in their own right, they provide little guidance about the temporal distribution 
of pollutants. To examine whether emissions are converging, further testing 
using state-level data is necessary. 
 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
 
Stochastic Convergence 
 
The null hypothesis that state emission levels are diverging is first examined 
by testing for a unit root in the logarithm of pollution per capita in state i 
relative to the average of all states. Stochastic convergence implies that shocks 
to state pollution relative to the average will be temporary, implying that the 
log-relative series is a stationary process. Following a shock to the system, per 
capita pollution in state i can move further above or below the national average 
only temporarily. Alternatively, under the unit root null hypothesis, relative 
emissions are nonstationary, suggesting that shocks have permanent effects. 
Following a shock to per capita emissions in state i, under the null hypothesis, 
there is no tendency to return toward the average, implying that emissions will 
diverge. Since a state-specific constant term is included in the test, stochastic 
convergence is consistent with conditional convergence. 
To illustrate, we let xit denote the natural logarithm of the ratio of state 
i per capita pollution relative to the national average in year t. A unit root 
implies that xit is a nonstationary series, which can be described as follows 
 
(1)  
 
where μi is a state-specific constant term or “drift,” βi =1, and εit is a white noise 
error term that is independent and identically distributed. A nonstationary xit 
implies that any new shock (εit) to relative pollution in state i will cause a 
permanent change with no tendency to converge back to a stable state-specific 
compensating differential, implying that per capita emission levels will diverge. 
 
Perron (1989) demonstrates that failure to allow for an existing structural 
break leads to a bias against rejecting a false unit root null hypothesis. Perron 
(1989) proposes to allow for one known, or “exogenous,” structural break in 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF, hereafter) unit root test. Following Perron 
(1989), Zivot and Andrews (1992) (ZA hereafter), and others, propose ADF-type 
tests to determine the break point “endogenously” from the data. The ZA test 
selects the break point where the t-statistic that tests the unit root null is 
minimized (i.e., the most negative) and, therefore, least favorable to the unit 
root hypothesis. 
 
A potential problem common to the ZA and other ADF-type endogenous 
break unit root tests is that they derive their critical values while assuming 
no structural break(s) under the null. Nunes, Newbold, and Kuan (1997) and 
Lee and Strazicich (2001) show that this assumption leads to size distortions 
in the presence of a unit root with break. When utilizing ADF-type endogenous 
break tests, researchers might incorrectly conclude that a time series is 
trend-stationary when in fact the series is nonstationary with break(s). As such, 
a “spurious rejection” may result. To provide a remedy, we utilize the minimum 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) unit root tests of Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004). 
These tests endogenously determine one or two structural breaks in level and 
trend. 
 
Implementation of the two-break minimum LM unit root test can be described 
as follows. According to theLM(score) principle, a unit root test statistic 
can be obtained from the following regression 
 
 
After identifying two breaks in level and trend for each state, we examine 
the significance of each estimated break coefficient at the 10-percent level in an 
asymptotic normal distribution (i.e., critical value is 1.645). If two breaks are 
not significant, we reestimate our data using the one-break minimum LM unit 
root test of Lee and Strazicich (2004). If no break is significant at the 10-percent 
level in the one-break test, we utilize the conventional (no-break) ADF test.13 
 
 
Time Series Test for β-Convergence 
 
As previously noted, the conventional cross-section test for _-convergence 
has been criticized in the literature. In this paper, we utilize a time series 
test for _-convergence that was suggested in Carlino and Mills (1993). If per 
capita incomes are converging, then regression of the log relative income series 
on an intercept and trend should find opposite signs on their estimated 
coefficients. Intuitively, if a state has initial pollution emissions above the national 
mean then the intercept term of the log-relative series would be positive 
and the rate of growth of emissions should be negative in order for convergence 
to occur. Given that we identify structural breaks in level and trend for 
nearly all states, we wish to utilize this information in our time series tests for 
β-convergence. 
Our testing methodology can be described as follows. After performing unit 
root tests on the log of relative emissions as described above, we identify those 
states that reject the unit root null hypothesis (at the 10 percent level of significance). 
These time-series can be described as (trend) stationary around (in 
nearly all cases) one or two structural breaks in level and trend. Then, OLS 
regressions are performed on the log-relative emission series (xt) for each of 
these states as follows 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Prior to testing for convergence, it is interesting to examine our per capita 
emissions data to determine if the period around 1970 can be identified as a 
time of structural change. To perform this task, we estimate the minimum LM 
unit root test for each pollutant type using the raw data for the entire sample 
period of 1929–1999. The results are displayed in Table 2. The results indicate 
that the period surrounding 1970 does indeed contain a significant number of 
structural breaks in emissions. For each pollutant type, our results identify 
significant structural breaks in 21 (44 percent) of 48 states during the period 
around 1970 (1968–1976). We will now examine the time periods before and 
after 1970. 
 
 
Lack of Convergence in Most States under Local Control 
 
Estimation results are presented in Tables 3–6. We first examine the test 
results for stochastic convergence in Tables 3 and 4. Regardless of the pollutant 
type and time period examined, the null of a unit root is rejected in nearly all 
cases (i.e., for SO2 85 percent of states reject the unit root null before 1970 and 
92 percent after; for NOx 83 percent of states reject the unit root null before 
1970 and 88 percent after).17 These findings clearly reject the null that differences 
from the mean in per capita emission rates are nonstationary and, thus, 
provide support for stochastic convergence. As noted above, however, stochastic 
convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for convergence. To further 
our investigation, we next examine the results of testing the time-series 
notion of _-convergence in Tables 5 and 6. These results are consistent for both 
types of pollutants. Prior to 1970 and the period of federal pollution control, the 
results for SO2 indicate that for about one-half of the states (52 percent) pollution 
emission rates were diverging. ForNOx, the results indicate that emissions 
are diverging for nearly half of the states (44 percent). 
 
These results make sense in light of our discussion of interjurisdictional 
competition and the possibility of a regulatory race to the bottom. Industrial 
processes have historically been large emitters of SO2. Within this group of 
emitters are firms in the chemicals sector, primary metals industry, paper and 
allied sector, and many other types of manufacturers, all of which provide a 
tax base (jobs, etc.) annually to state and local economies. As discussed above, 
in their pursuit of firms and jobs, some policymakers may have attempted to 
attract polluting industry, inducing a divergence of emissions (see also Break, 
1967, and Cumberland, 1980, who develop this “race to the bottom” argument 
more fully). Combining our empirical estimates with the fact that over this time 
period poorer states witnessed a much larger increase in their SO2 emission 
levels than wealthier states, we conclude that there is evidence which suggests 
some states have drifted away from one income/pollution path to another over 
time. This suggests the possibility that some states were setting increasingly 
lenient environmental policies to attract mobile capital (since in spite of converging 
incomes, emissions convergence is not predominate in the data). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Convergence Followed the Environmental Movement 
 
Examining data from 1970 to 1999, a time span when the federal government 
played a much stronger role in air pollution regulation via the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1970, we find different results. During this later period of 
more federal pollution control, we see stronger evidence that emissions are converging. 
The post-1970 results are displayed in Tables 5 and 6.We first examine 
the (short-run) impact on convergence in the period immediately following the 
imposition of federal controls. For SO2, in contrast to the earlier time period, 
pollution emissions are now clearly converging for most states (75 percent). For 
NOx, the evidence is essentially unchanged as compared to the earlier period, 
with convergence occurring in about one-half (54 percent) of the states. Given 
that adjustment of pollution patterns to federal controls may take time, we next 
examine the long-run evidence of convergence after 1970. In the long run, the 
evidence for convergence of SO2 emissions is essentially unchanged (73 percent 
of states are found to have converged), but the evidence for convergence of NOx 
gets considerably stronger: 75 percent of states are now found to be converging 
(up from 54 percent). 
 
These empirical findings suggest that an added silver lining followed the 
centralization of environmental policies in the U.S.: since many types of pollutants 
are believed to have threshold effects (e.g., a minimum level that can 
be emitted before serious harm), pollutants having an equivalent conditional 
mean across space may decrease the chance of crossing important thresholds. 
In addition, from a social welfare perspective, this finding is of note because 
policymakers may be interested in a more equal distribution of public “bads,” 
such as pollution.18 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Empirical studies examining the temporal path of relative incomes have 
recently proliferated, with the bulk of evidence suggesting that the conditional 
convergence prediction of Solow’s (1956) neoclassical growth model adequately 
describes the growth process. At the same time, a large literature has developed 
that finds a link between income and pollution levels through time (e.g., 
Grossman and Krueger, 1995). While these findings are important in isolation, 
combining their key features yields potentially significant new insights. In this 
study we link these two literatures by examining the spatial and temporal distribution 
of pollution. Since key aspects of any public policy are efficiency and 
distributional consequences, our results may also have policy relevance. 
 
Using state-level data on sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from 
1929 to 1999, we find that during the years of state pollution control, for about 
one-half of the states, emissions did not converge. Interestingly, lower state 
emission levels and stronger evidence of emissions convergence occurred in 
the era of federal controls. These findings are consonant with the notion that 
without a nationwide pollution control standard certain regions or groups of 
people may not enjoy a similar quality of air and water as individuals in other 
regions. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. In the U.S., responsibility of regulating polluters rested almost exclusively with the states 
until 1970 (Portney, 1990). The federal government began to take a more active role in 
environmental regulation during the Nixon years when the President declared himself an 
environmentalist and proclaimed the onset of the “environmental decade” on January 1, 1970. 
President Nixon subsequently passed the most important air pollution control bill in history—the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970—and created the EPA by executive order in 1970 to 
implement the Amendments. This regime change affords us the opportunity to examine pollution 
paths in the pre- and post-centralization eras to make inference regarding the relationship 
between institutional arrangements and the spatial distribution of pollutants. 
 
2. The causal mechanism for this EKC has been the subject of some debate. Some analysts 
have pointed to political economy linkages (such as based on the Coase theorem), and others 
have emphasized the technical relationship between consumption and abatement (e.g., 
Andreoni and Levinson, 2001), or changes in this relationship over time due to technical change 
(e.g., Stokey,1998). Brock and Taylor (2004) present a model wherein technical change in 
abatement is proportional to the average abatement intensity in the economy (i.e., individual 
abatement efforts provide knowledge spillovers to others in the economy). 
 
3. One oft-cited disadvantage of local regulatory decision making is that spill-overs are not 
internalized, and therefore too much pollution is a general outcome when localities have 
regulatory authority. Another disadvantage of local pollution control relates to the potentially 
adverse consequences of interjurisdictional competition (Wilson (1996) and below). 
 
4. Of course, given the mobility opportunities in the U.S., individuals will migrate in response 
to spatial arbitrage opportunities, leading to the marginal person being indifferent to locations at 
any point in time. 
 
5. Policymakers may be tempted to resort to lax environmental policies in an effort to attract 
mobile capital (as opposed to, for example, more efficient capital subsidies) if environmental 
policy formulation is less transparent to voters (“optimal obfuscation”). 
 
6. For an overview of reasons why competing local jurisdictions may produce distorted 
outcomes, refer to surveys by Wellisch (2000) and Wilson (1996, 1999). Oates (2002) 
concludes that the theoretical literature is inconclusive on whether races to the bottom or 
optimal regulation (i.e., convergence of pollution in light of the evidence above) will occur. 
 
7. This type of convergence has been termed conditional convergence by Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil (1992). Conditional convergence occurs if state-level emissions converge to a (state-
specific) constant differential. This definition appears appropriate given that assimilative 
capacities, preferences, etc., differ across states. 
 
8. Stochastic convergence not necessarily implying convergence is further apparent from the 
possibility that the log ratio series may be trend-stationary along a trend that diverges from the 
national mean. 
 
 
9. For examples of papers that criticize the cross-section test of _-convergence see Friedman, 
1992; Quah, 1993; Evans and Karras, 1996a. 
 
10. For a detailed discussion of the methods used to estimate our emissions data please see 
the document “National Air Pollutant Emission Trends, Procedures Document, 1900–1996” 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1998). Various procedure reports are available on the 
web at “http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/index.html.” It should be noted that the emissions 
data employed in our empirical tests are primarily estimated from actual fuel consumption and 
emissions, and not from state or national aggregate income, industrial production, or GDP. We 
thank Roy Huntley and the staff of the EPA for helpful discussions regarding the emissions data. 
 
 
11. To determine the optimal number of k lagged augmentation terms that correct for serial 
correlation in equation (2) we follow the “general to specific” procedure suggested by Perron 
(1989). At each combination of two breaks in the time interval [.1T, .9T] (to eliminate end 
points), where T is the sample size, we begin with a maximum number of lagged first-
differenced terms k = 8 and examine the last term to see if it is significantly different from zero at 
the 10-percent level in an asymptotic normal distribution (critical value is 1.645). If insignificant, 
the maximum lagged term is dropped and the model is reestimated with k = 7 terms and so on, 
until either the maximum term is found or k = 0, at which point the procedure stops. This 
technique has been shown to perform well as compared to other data dependent procedures to 
select the number of lagged augmented terms (e.g., Ng and Perron, 1995). 
 
12. Although the critical values for the minimum LM test with intercept and trend breaks 
depend (somewhat) on the location of the break(s), the test remains free of size distortions and 
spurious rejections in the presence of a unit root with break(s). 
 
13. Gauss codes for the one- and two-break minimum LM unit root test are available online at 
http://www.cba.ua.edu/~jlee/gauss. 
 
14. See Tomljanovich and Vogelsang (2002) for a similar application of the time-series notion 
of β-convergence applied to per capita incomes of the U.S. regions. 
 
15. Tomljanovich and Vogelsang (2002) do not consider this possibility. 
 
16. Ibid. 
 
17. While using panel data can increase power in unit root tests, given the strong rejection of 
the unit root hypothesis for nearly all states, the use of panel tests would not provide any 
additional information as compared to our univariate tests. For example, using the panel unit 
root test of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) a rejection of the null indicates only that at least one 
state is stochastically converging. 
 
18. Carlino and Mills (1996) note that while state per capita incomes were converging 
throughout 1929–1990; they diverged from 1978 to 1988. In addition, most state income 
convergence occurred prior to 1946. Taken together, these facts strengthen our findings that the 
period surrounding 1970 characterized a structural break. For example, in spite of diverging per 
capita incomes in the post-1970 period, per capita emissions were converging in more states 
than before 1970. 
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